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The financialization of large law firms: situated discourses 






It is perhaps not surprising that large and global corporate law firms have prospered 
in the latter parts of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. A broad range of 
literature has revealed that corporate law firms have grown in size and geographical 
reach thanks to their central role in lubricating financial markets and activities from 
currency trading and the work of hedge funds, to mergers and acquisitions and the 
financial restructuring of transnational corporations (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2008; 
Flood, 2007; Quack, 2007). Massive increases in profits, such as the 157 percent 
absolute increase in profit per equity partner experienced by the ten largest English 
corporate law firms between 1993 and 2008 (Legal Business, 2008) are, therefore, 
unlikely to come as a shock to people familiar with the workings of the international 
financial system and the economies of world cities such as London and New York.1 
But, we contend, the story of the growing profitability of large corporate law firms and 
the increasing remuneration of leading partners in these firms is not as simple as it 
might first appear. Specifically, in this paper we suggest that the extraordinary 
increases in the profitability of large and global corporate law firms recorded, in 
particular, over the past decade are not only a result of firms generating more and 
more demand for their work and charging ever higher fees for their services. Whilst 
this is part of the story, in this paper we argue that spikes in profitability are also the 
                                            
1
 The 157 percent increase refers to growth in profit levels excluding inflation. 
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result of a process of financialization that has reengineered law firms to make them 
appear to be ever more profitable and successful.  
 
As a concept, financialization is used in the existing literature to capture a diverse 
array of changes associated with the penetration of financial market logics into the 
management and organization of business. Here we draw on one particular line of 
work which highlights how financial logics have redefined corporate governance and 
re-orientated the mandates of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial 
Officers (CFOs) towards the generation of shareholder value through the payment of 
dividends and sustained increases in the firm‟s share price (see Feng et al. [2001] 
and Froud et al. [2006] for theoretical explanations and Froud et al. [2002], O‟Neill 
[2001] and Pike [2006] for empirical case studies).  
 
We are, of course, at an interesting juncture in the process of financialization. Events 
during 2007 and 2008 in the banking sector have shown the frailties of the short term 
profit maximisation associated with shareholder value logics in terms of the long-term 
stability of firms. Indeed, the financialized model of capitalism and its focus on 
shareholder value has come under so much scrutiny that the former GE chief Jack 
Welch, one of the accepted „fathers‟ of such logics, declared in early 2009 that the 
idea was „dumb‟ because shareholder value has became the focus of strategy, not 
the outcome of successful strategy (Financial Times, 2009). Such a realization 
comes as no surprise to the authors cited above, who have offered a range of 
critiques of financialized shareholder logics. But it does pose a number of interesting 
strategic questions for firms that have become enchanted by the logic of shareholder 
value and proxy indicators of such value, for example Economic Value Added 
(EVATM) or in the case of the legal industry Profits Per Equity Partner (PEP)..  
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In this context, this paper draws on cultural economy debates which focus on the 
discursive construction and reproduction of management practices designed to 
enhance shareholder value to interpret the restructuring and apparent growth in 
profitability of large English corporate law firms between 1993 and 2008. Firstly, the 
paper makes an empirical contribution to debates about financialization by 
considering the intriguing case of large law firms, the rise to pre-eminence of PEP as 
a metric in the legal industry, and the resultant way that privately held organisations, 
not listed on stock markets, have become enchanted by management logics similar 
to those promoted by shareholder value discourses. As another example of what 
Leyshon and Thrift (2007) would call the capitalization of everything, we also 
consider how large law firms‟ obsessions with PEP as a financial performance metric 
might explain the impacts of the current credit crunch on law firms and the fact that 
these have been much more severe than in previous recessions. This potentially 
provides another empirical example of the frailties of financialized practice and the 
short-termism associated with shareholder value discourses. Secondly, and 
theoretically, the paper explores the geographies of financialization in the legal 
industry by focussing on the specific contextual factors that led large English 
corporate law firms to reengineer themselves to enhance performance as measured 
by the new PEP metric. We argue that whilst such a process of financialization has 
affected the strategies of large law firms worldwide, the specific timing and nature of 
changes in the English context are mediated by a series of geographically contingent 
factors. In particular, we consider the way changing regulatory environments and the 
resultant changes to institutional logics were intimately tied to the construction of a 
particular conjunctural moment in which financial discourses associated with the PEP 
metric gained legitimacy and took hold of law firm strategy in England. This reveals 
the power of situated analyses of financialization in explaining the proliferation of 




Theories of financialization 
 
Constructing models of the financialized firm 
 
One of the main contributions of cultural economy perspectives on financialization 
has been to highlight the new metrics used by pension fund managers and other 
capital market actors in financial analyses of firms over the last 20 years or so. 
Shareholder value measures such as EVATM, Market Value Added (MVA), Total 
Shareholder Return (TSR) and Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI) have now 
become well known both within the business world but also in academic studies (e.g. 
Gleadle and Cornelius, 2008; Lazonick and O‟Sullivan, 2000) as firms have become 
intertwined with financial markets in ways which force them to constantly prioritise the 
delivery of shareholder value. Such models, and the practices they promote, gained 
legitimacy because of the powerful voices of the media, of activist investors such as 
pension funds and of consultants like the Boston Consulting Group and Stern 
Stewart who present shareholder value as the only way to assess the success of a 
firm and the only influence to consider when managing a firm (Feng et al., 2001). 
This is, then, an example of the effect of what Thrift (1997) describes as the circuit of 
soft capitalism in which management gurus, the media and business schools 
advance economic practices claimed to optimise performance in the „new‟ knowledge 
economy (see also Clark et al. [2004] and Greenfield and Williams [2007] on the role 
of the media).  
 
As a result of these discourses of shareholder value and their power, measures such 
as EVATM increasingly guide the actions of senior managers (O‟Neill, 2001) because 
of the way they produce a series of measurable quantitative „facts‟ about the success 
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of the firm. These facts then become the target of management strategies. Indeed, 
one of the outcomes of the pre-eminence of shareholder value logics, according to 
Lazonick and O‟Sullivan (2000), is a series of important changes as strategies 
designed to pursue long-term objectives such as market share get replaced with 
short term strategies designed to immediately enhance performance as measured by 
metrics such as TSR and EVATM. According to Lazonick and O‟Sullivan (2000), such 
forms of financialized management involve a shift away from a „retain and reinvest‟ 
allocative regime in which growing the firm through the recycling of profits is the main 
priority, to a „downsize and distribute‟ regime in which changes to the labour force 
structure and/or capital divestures and/or strategic re-focussing of the firm are used 
to allow more surplus profits to be distributed to shareholders. As Lazonick and 
O‟Sullivan show, this leads to surprising strategies such as redundancies at times of 
boom as part of attempts to cut costs, reduce investment in the business and free up 
capital for distribution to shareholders, thus enhancing shareholder value as defined 
by metrics like TSR.  
 
However, as Froud et al. (2006) show using case studies of GlaxoSmithKline, Ford 
and GE, „downsize and distribute‟ regimes may help to boost a firm‟s short term 
performance as measured by TSR or other metrics of shareholder value, but in 
reality hide deeper problems with the firm‟s market or products; problems which are 
eventually brought to light in a downturn when the firm can no-longer „hide‟ its 
weaknesses.  Consequently, as Froud et al. (2006, 65) put it, we might say that “the 
rhetoric of shareholder value sets management on a utopian quest for growth and 
higher returns from capital which has variable and uncertain consequences”. As 
Froud et al. argue, measures such as EVATM and TSR do not lead, then, to the stable 
adoption of homogeneous financialized management and „surgery‟ strategies 
designed to enhance shareholder value. Following du Gay and Pryke (2002) and 
adopting a performative perspective (see in particular MacKenzie and Millo, 2003), 
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Froud et al. (2006, 71-72) argue that discourses of shareholder value produce 
financialized management practices rather than represent practices that already 
exist. Models such as TSR influence the thinking of managers and lead to the 
development of a range of untried and untested techniques designed to enhance the 
firm‟s performance as measured by shareholder value metrics. Hence those adopting 
a cultural economy approach suggest that the affects of such „improvised‟ financial 
management practices on firms are at best unclear and at worst damaging because 
unexpected side effects can erode the long-term ability of the firm to respond to 
market challenges of opportunities.  
 
In the second half of the paper we examine how such interpretations of financialized 
management practices can be used to explain the drivers of changes in the structure 
and ultimately profitability of law firms over recent years. First, however, it is 
important to consider how geography influences financial management practices and 
the way such practices are developed, diffused and enacted.  
 
 
Geographies of financialization 
 
Geography exercises multiple influences over the development and diffusion of the 
discourse of shareholder value and the resultant financially orientated management 
practices. For example, Pike (2006) shows how, in assessments of shareholder 
value, both the geography of the firm being assessed and the geography of those 
making the assessment influence management practices. Using the case of the 
closure of the Vaux brewery in Sunderland, Pike (2006, 216) reveals how 
“phenomena such as financialization and shareholder value are necessarily shaped 
and contested by specific and particular arrangements of spatialized social relations, 
social agency, and socio-institutional contexts over time, across space and in place”. 
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This suggests more attention needs to be paid to the way geography can determine 
the impacts of financialized practices, something Leyshon and Thrift (2007) also call 
for by highlighting how capitalization both actively exploits the geographical 
specificities of places but also unevenly effects (positively and negatively) different 
locations. Similarly, Froud et al. (2001, 104-105) note that “Financialization is not an 
immanent principle because its spread is limited by structural barriers within, and by 
institutional differences between, national economies”.  
 
As a result, it is now generally accepted that the homogenisation thesis in relation to 
the spread of shareholder value logics and financialized management practices is 
misleading (Lütz, 2004). However, this does not mean that forms of shareholder 
value driven financialized management are not becoming more and more common in 
different national contexts. As Clark et al. (2002) show using the case of Germany, 
Anglo-American Accounting standards and pension fund practices have begun to 
penetrate continental European countries as negotiated compromises are reached 
about the implementation of financial models of management that prioritise 
shareholder value. Culpepper (2005) makes a similar point using the example of 
France and shows that regulatory reform, whilst not automatically leading on its own 
to the adoption of financialized management models, is, when accompanied by wider 
institutional change in attitudes and opinions relating to work and management 
practices, an important ingredient in the international diffusion and reproduction of 
shareholder value logics and financialized management. Table 1 offers further 
examples of the connection between regulation and the adoption of financial 
business practices. This suggests, following Jackson and Deeg (2008), that it is 
important to develop explanations of the effects of functional change - i.e. political 
change relating to regulatory context - and of institutional change - i.e. business 
norms, on the adoption of new financialized management techniques in different 
contexts.  
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[Insert table 1] 
   
The rest of the paper, therefore, examines, firstly, the nature of financialized 
management in law firms and the way discourses of financialization have shaped 
firms‟ strategies over recent years. The paper then, secondly, examines the situated 
context influencing the emergence and adoption of financialized practices in English 
law firms. In doing this analysis shows how the reproduction of financialized logics is 
conjuntural and mediated by broader political-economic and institutional context 
which defines the timing and nature of the process of financialization. We conclude 
with some reflections on how financialization may have contributed to the impact of 





Our analysis is constructed using a triangulation of data from various sources. 
Quantitative material charting the composition and performance of large English law 
firms was taken from The Legal Business 100 survey between 1993 and 2008. This 
longitudinal analysis allows us to extrapolate historical trends in the financial 
performance and organizational structure of English law firms whilst also providing 
insights into the changing management practices that are associated with 
financialization. We focus our analysis on the 10 largest firms, primarily because of 
the emphasis that these firms have placed on financialized management techniques 
in recent years. The trends identified are, nonetheless, relevant to the wider sample 
of firms analysed in the aforementioned survey. These trends are also relevant more 
broadly to large law firms worldwide, and in particular to US based practices. 
However, here we focus on the largest firms in England to help tease out the 
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geographically specific way in which English firms „became financialized‟ in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. 
  
We also completed an extensive survey of articles in legal publications aimed at 
practitioners in the UK (The Lawyer, Legal Business and Legal Week). This provided 
further detail of the changing financial performance and strategies of firms as well as 
insight into media reactions to these changes. Finally we undertook twenty interviews 
during late 2006 and early 2007 in large corporate law firms in England. Interviewees 
were drawn from firms representing different segments of The Legal Business 100 
survey, ranging from the largest, multi-office international firms through to nation-
wide firms and single office practices. Interviews lasted between 40 and 70 minutes, 
were recorded, transcribed and then coded. All interviewees were questioned about 
the strategy of the firm they worked for, recent changes to the organization of the 
firm, working conditions and practices within the firm, managerial structures and 
styles, and the impact of commercial (financial and client-driven) pressures on their 
day-to-day work. Analysis of the interviews is used to help explain the trends 
identified in the quantitative data collected. 
 
 
The emergence of financialized large law firms 
 
In many ways, the adoption of financial practices by large law firms is a significant 
development. Law, as one of the few state sponsored professions like accountancy, 
is supposed to have a fiduciary duty towards clients and the broader public and, 
historically at least, is supposed to represent a public safeguard service. Law firms 
had not, therefore, traditionally been seen as organisations in which commercial 
logics prevailed. To this end, until recently law firms In England and in many 
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countries throughout the world could only exist as partnerships in which the owners 
of the firm were those delivering the services.2 In many ways the logic of this takes 
us back to the work of Berle and Means (1932) who studied the dangers of 
separating ownership and control in firms because of the moral hazard it creates. In 
law firms, it was assumed that if lawyers owned and managed the firm they would 
place the client‟s interests and their professional responsibilities above all else 
because profitability relied on the firm‟s reputation for service quality and the long-
term development of this reputation, rather than on the extraction of short-term profits 
to enhance the firm‟s success in financial terms (Empson and Chapman, 2006). In 
addition, it was also assumed that the owners, the partners, would also be acting as 
the managers of junior lawyers and would ensure all staff maintained the levels of 
quality expected so as to protect the reputation of the firm.   
 
In today‟s post-Enron context, many would be rightly sceptical of suggestions that 
professionals, and corporate lawyers in particular, provide publicly spirited services. 
As Hanlon (2004) describes, idealistic visions of what lawyers and law firms are and 
do, if they were ever accurate, have today certainly been diluted by the rise of mega-
law firms (see table 2) with their business orientated outlook. However, whilst such 
large law firms were always firmly rooted in what Heinz and Lauman (1982) referred 
to as „the corporate hemisphere of the law‟, over the past 15 years or so the largest 
corporate law firms have undergone a significant reorganization and, as a result, 
increasingly mirror in their structure and operations the market-listed, financially 
motivated clients which they advise.  
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
                                            
2
 As we discuss below, reforms in Australia and England and Wales have changed this 
situation in the period post 2000. 
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Table 3 captures the main changes involved in this process. Two trends are 
particularly significant:  
1. In the 1990s a rapid growth in profits as measured by PEP, which outstrips 
growth in revenue, together with a significant increase in the number of 
salaried solicitors (associate and assistants). Growth in the category of 
salaried solicitor outstripped expansion in equity partners (senior lawyers), 
thus leading to growing leverage ratios (the ratio of junior salaried lawyers to 
senior equity partners). 
2. In the 2000s the remarkable expansion of a relatively new employment 
category: salaried partners. This occurred alongside an unprecedented year 
on year increase in PEP. 
 
In the next section we consider the causes and consequences of these trends and 
explain how they are related to the financialization of the largest law firms in England.  
In particular, we consider the role of PEP as a metric used to measure law firms‟ 
success and the way the discourses associated with this metric, which is premised 
on a similar logic to that of shareholder value, encouraged the penetration of financial 
management practices deep into the fabric of law firms.  
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
 
PEP and new financial discourses in the legal industry 
 
Originally developed in the USA in the 1980s by the American Lawyer magazine, just 
like shareholder value, PEP has become the metric of law firms‟ success. In the 
English context, the first PEP rankings were produced in 1993 by Legal Business 
and, since then, the publication‟s annual reports of PEP have become a key 
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reference for those wanting to assess the success of different firms. Indeed, by the 
late 1990s other publications had also begun to champion the PEP metric and in 
2007 The Lawyer, one of the most influential legal publications in England, trumpeted 
its own „Top of the PEPs‟ table designed to provide “the definitive inside track on the 
performance of the UK's biggest law firms” (The Lawyer 2007a). In addition, as well 
as specialist legal publications, the financial press has also played an important role 
in the rise to prominence of this metric. The Financial Times now gives annual 
„innovative lawyers‟ awards, one category being management which can include 
“issues such as international expansion and rising profitability” (see 
http://media.ft.com/cms/d1fbb852-ce3a-11db-b5c8-000b5df10621.pdf [last accessed 
28th April 2009]). The winner of the first management award in 2007 was Eversheds 
for its partner profit sharing scheme.  
 
The influence of the media in the production and proliferation of PEP as a discourse 
should, therefore, not be underestimated. Mirroring the findings of Clark et al. (2004) 
and Greenfield and Williams (2007), it seems that the way the media analyses, ranks 
and publicises the performance of law firms legitimates certain types of action and, in 
particular, attempts by management to improve PEP. Winning an award from the FT 
or improving one‟s position in the relevant PEP tables has become a key concern for 
law firm leaders. Senior and managing partners, often supported by developed media 
and public relations departments, actively engage with the press as a way to secure 
favourable write-ups which could enhance their firm‟s reputation. Reflecting this 
obsession, the managing partner of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer made the 
following comment about the firm‟s past performance after restructuring delivered a 
massive rise in PEP, “we did not have the financial performance that is necessary or 
appropriate for a firm of the calibre of ours” (Lawyer Podcast, February 2007. 
Available from www.thelawyer.com). Similarly, after the announcement that the firm 
had broken the £500,000 PEP barrier, the managing partner of Eversheds said, 
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“profitability has been one of our key targets over the past year, and with PEP 
breaking the £500,000 barrier, we have proven our ability to deliver on our promises” 
(The Lawyer 2007b).   
 
Of course, the result of this new obsession is a devastating critique of firms failing to 
increase PEP. These firms are seen as poorly managed organisations in need of 
refurbishment. So when the firm Shoosmiths reported a 27 percent increase in 
turnover but only a three percent rise in PEP, these results were described as „mixed‟ 
and blame was placed on “a period of sustained expansion and a major recruitment 
drive across seven UK offices [that] have taken their toll on the firm‟s profitability” 
(The Lawyer 2007c). It would seem, then, that in the new epoch of financialization, 
long-term investments associated with growth, which are typical of a „retain and 
reinvest‟ regime (Lazonick and O‟Sullivan, 2000) are not necessarily seen as wholly 
positive. The next section of the paper, therefore, considers the way the discursive 
power of PEP metrics and rankings has influenced the management of law firms and 
has led to introduction of new organizational structures and employment patterns in 
the legal profession.  
 
 
Financialization in action: the restructuring of English law firms 
 
Despite the fact that law firms, with the exception of one Australian firm, continue to 
be structured as partnerships and have no external shareholders or institutional 
investors to satisfy, the effects of media-inspired concerns about PEP seem to have 
led to the adoption of similar management logics to those used in shareholder-value 
driven organizations. This implies a series of radical adjustments and structural 
developments resonant of the forms of „surgery‟ (Lazonick and O‟Sullivan, 2000) and 
strategic re-focussing usually associated with processes of financialization (Feng et 
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al., 2001). Firstly, large law firms, and particularly a number of those listed in table 2, 
have refocused on a limited array of practice areas, such as capital markets and 
especially work associated with derivatives and „exotic‟ financial products, which are 
closest to the logic and operations of „finance capitalism‟ and which offer some of the 
more handsome financial rewards. Secondly, and consequently, there has been a 
shift in the largest firms from retainer relationships, whereby lawyers act as long-term 
advisers, to a focus on one-off transactions from which maximum fees can be 
generated. Finally, there has been the introduction of new organizational structures 
(e.g. industry focused groups), again designed to maximise profits through 
specialisation in particular types of legal transactions at the expense of full service 
provision.  
 
Perhaps most significantly, though, law firms have engaged, over recent years, in a 
radical restructuring of their own internal division of labour. Such surgeries are 
designed to improve performance as measured by PEP and have turned law firms 
into very different organizations to their predecessors. However, as our analysis 
below demonstrates, the changes associated with the reorganization of firms‟ internal 
divisions of labour are intimately related to the frailties of PEP as a measure of 
success in the legal profession. Our analysis shows the ease with which 
management techniques can improve PEP without actually improving (or by even 
damaging) the underlying performance of the firm, something which is particularly 
pertinent in the context of the current financial crisis.  
 
 
Leverage as financial management 
 
PEP, crucially, does not measure the total profits generated by a firm, but the total 
profits divided by the number of equity partners. Equity partners are the „owners‟ of 
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the firm and, as such, share the profits but also risks associated with legal practice. 
To become an equity partner, an individual will usually have to serve many years as 
an „apprentice‟ lawyer, or be accepted into the partnership by existing equity partners 
as a „lateral hire‟ from another firm (incidentally a practice which is increasingly 
significant as firms scramble to build their profitability by poaching key profit 
generators, known as „rain makers‟ in the legal profession). As the „traditional‟ legal 
partnership was made up of equity partners only, profit per partner in the past was 
effectively the same as PEP. Increasingly, though, an expanding cohort of salaried 
solicitors, whose remuneration is not linked to profits (besides the effect of bonus 
schemes), operate as a new and growing tier in what is an increasingly pyramidal 
division of labour. These salaried workers allow more profit to be generated but, as a 
consequence of their salaried status, do not affect the number of people sharing the 
profits, hence delivering an increase in PEP and improvements in the relevant 
ranking tables. In reality, then, profits per partner (PPP) or profits per lawyer (PPL) 
might be better measures of the performance of a firm. Indeed, analysing PPP and 
PPL between 1993 and 2008 reveals that the reorganization of law firms has led to 
exaggerated increases in PEP (157 percent 1993-2008) compared to more „accurate‟ 
measures of efficiency and success (85 and 80 percent for PPP and PPL 
respectively). However, because of PEP‟s hegemony as the measure of law firms‟ 
success, managing partners have focussed on reorganizing the labour process in 
ways that optimise performance as measured by this metric.  
 
As a result, in the first stage, as Ackroyd and Muzio (2007) report, throughout the 
1980s and 1990s attempts by partners in law firms to drive up profitability involved 
leveraging the performance and contribution of a rapidly expanding cohort of salaried 
junior solicitors (associates). Consequently, the legal profession endured a 
monumental shift from a predominantly self-employed to a predominantly employed 
occupation with associate to equity partner ratios climbing from 1:2 in the mid 80s to 
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1.8:1 in 2006. These figures look even more impressive if we focus on the largest 
firms, where such changes have been most pronounced. As indicated by table 3, in 
2008 the average leverage ratio for the ten largest English firms was 6.9:1.   
 
Such changes respond to a clear financial logic: a salaried lawyer can generate 
substantially more fees than her labour costs (this surplus can oscillate, depending 
on the firm‟s size, between 2.5 and 4.8 times wage costs). Indeed, as illustrated by 
table 4, the appropriation of surpluses generated by non-equity workers currently 
constitutes the foundation of law firm economics and a key avenue to enhancing 
profitability. The rule of the game in the financialized law firm is therefore simple: 
increase the number of people who bake the cake (the number of salaried lawyers) 
whilst stabilising or reducing the number of people who can share the cake (the 
number of equity partners) (Maister, 1993). Larger helpings will inevitably follow in 
the form of enhanced PEP, even though actual profits per lawyer may have remained 
stable or even declined.  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Table 3 shows an increase in associate numbers 
and, therefore, growing leverage ratios throughout 1993 to 2003 period and that this 
coincides with gradual improvements in PEP. However, the increases are perhaps 
not as large as might have been expected, particularly in the period 1998-2003. In 
addition to broader contextual factors such as the dot.com slump of the early 2000s, 
this situation can also be partly explained by the aggressive expansion and 
globalization of firms in the late 1990s which involved many mergers and the 
acquisition of partners in offices inside and outside of England. This led to a marked 
increase in equity partners which somewhat diluted the effect of the leveraging 
strategies which were being implemented in the latter part of the 1990s. In effect, 
firms had not completely developed a recipe to maximise the growth of PEP. The 
post 2000 period, as discourses of performance and profitability gained traction, 
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therefore, led to the development of even more radical forms of surgery as firms 
restructured to maximize PEP. 
 
[insert table 4 here] 
 
Restructuring the partnership to manage PEP 
 
The redefinition and dilution of the concept of partnership through the creation of the 
new role of salaried partner and the increasing recourse to de-equitization have been 
key strategies adopted by law firms in their post-2000 restructuring. As table 3 
shows, from 2000 the number of salaried partners found in firms has expanded 
significantly. These individuals do not share profits, are not co-owners of the firm, but 
are handed the title partner because of its symbolic value. Whilst this category has 
existed from sometime prior to the period in question, numbers of salaried solicitors 
were so marginal that both Legal Business and The Lawyer did not collect data on 
them. However, since 2002 salaried partners have become the fastest growing 
section of the professional labour force, expanding by over 34%. Thus, salaried 
partnership, from an anomaly found only in a minority of firms, has been recast as a 
formal step in an increasingly elongated professional career structure. Writing in the 
80s, Richard Abel (1988) estimated an average wait of 5.5 years after qualification 
for a lawyer to achieve equity status in a firm; today this has doubled to over 10 
years. Furthermore, promotion is increasingly tied to some formal financial targets 
such as the ability to generate 3 times more revenues than ones own wage costs 
(Hanlon, 2004). Thus, introducing salaried partners as a form of labour market 
„surgery‟ responds to a clear financial logic: this new position delivers a convenient 
and acceptable device to prolong leverage and increase profitability.  
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Most radically, recent interventions have actually sought the reduction of equity 
partner headcount in a period of boom for legal services. Indeed, as indicated by 
table 3,  between 2003 and 2008 the number of equity partners employed in the 10 
largest firms in the UK contracted by 1% despite revenues growth of over 27%. 
These trends corroborate growing anecdotal evidence of de-equitization (redundancy 
of equity partners). This is a momentous and somewhat contested development and 
signifies a dramatic break with the past because of how partners, the owners of the 
firms, are treated as costs to be efficiently managed. „Chopping dead wood‟, to use a 
common expression, is a useful instrument in today‟s increasingly bloated, 
heterogeneous and geographically dispersed partnerships. This reduction in equity 
partners seems to be bound up with the quest of sustaining and expanding 
profitability by downgrading lesser performing partners or simply those working in 
less remunerative offices or practice areas that would otherwise dilute PEP and 
affect a firm‟s position in key ranking tables (The Lawyer, 2009h).  Thus, the updated 
strategy may be to actually reduce rather than simply stabilize those who share the 
cake, whilst of course continuing to expand those who participate in profit generation.  
 
It seems, then, that financial considerations and, in particular, the quest to enhance 
PEP, lie at the heart of one of the key developments in the legal profession: the 
reorganization of the ownership of firms – i.e. the partnership – through the creation 
of new positions in the division of labour in the form of the salaried partner and the 
redefinition of the very notion of partnership as a contingent and temporary status 
that can be withdrawn according to profitability considerations. Importantly, though, 
from a geographical perspective, the development and acceptance in the English 
context of PEP discourses and metrics can only be fully understood by considering 
the situated political-economic context in which English firms have been operating 
and the way this has helped create a conjunctural moment in which PEP league 




Situating the financialization of English law firms: neo-liberalism and 
regulatory reform  
 
When Legal Business first published its PEP tables in 1993, the re-regulation of the 
English legal market had already led to concerns about the profitability of English law 
firms. The key re-regulatory process causing this was the re-discovery in the 1980s 
by Thatcher‟s conservative administration of a neo-liberal political agenda which 
emphasized and celebrated competition, customer choice, open markets and private 
enterprise in economic affairs, including in the professions (Abel, 2003). However, 
the English system of the professions, with its emphasis on occupational licensing, 
self-regulation and restrictive arrangements that effectively created monopolies for 
services, did not sit comfortably with the new-found neo-liberal ideology. In the legal 
profession this led, amongst other things, to the suspension of some restrictive 
arrangements (on advertising and minimum fees for example) (Abel, 1988; 2003) but 
also the reduction of governmental expenditure on legal services through reforms of 
the Legal Aid scheme (Paterson and Goriely, 1999) and the partial liberalization of 
key monopolies such as conveyancing (Abel, 1988; 2003; Sherr, 1994; Muzio and 
Ackroyd, 2005). Perhaps most significant for our argument here, though, was the 
impact of neo-liberal ideals on London‟s financial markets and their subsequent 
affects on the legal industry. 
 
Re-regulation and financialization I: The legal ‘big bang’ 
The 1986 „big bang‟, which opened financial markets in London to foreign firms for 
the first time, was intimately related to the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s and a 
desire for market competition in all areas of the economy. Indeed, „big bang‟ acted as 
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a blue-print for successive de-regulatory initiatives designed to maintain and develop 
London‟s world city status. In particular, the financial „big bang‟ helped to position 
London as a global marketplace for professional advisory services, including law, 
thus preparing the ground for the legal profession‟s very own „big bang‟ that 
eventually took place in 1990. This reform opened up, for the first time, the English 
legal market to overseas law firms (Cullen-Mandikos and MacPherson 2002). 
Previously many US firms had entered London but only to provide advice on US law. 
After 1990, however, re-regulation allowed these firms to recruit English lawyers, 
provide advice on English legal issues and thus compete with London‟s Magic Circle 
firms (Clifford Chance, Linklaters, Freshfields, Allen & Overy and Slaughter & May). 
This created new competition and, most significantly for our argument here, 
positioned English incumbents against competitors with significantly higher levels of 
profits.  
 
Here is not the place to review the complex array of differences between English and 
US large law firms (but see Faulconbridge, 2008a; Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007). 
It is, however, well known that one of the major differences has long been the 
approach taken to profitability and the remuneration of lawyers, with the US „eat what 
you kill‟ system prioritising financial success by tying equity partners‟ take-home 
salary to the profits they generate themselves (Regan, 2004). In contrast, the English 
lockstep system bases partner pay on years of service and rewards loyalty ahead of 
profitability. As a result of US firms‟ emphasis on profits through the eat what you kill 
system, their closer ties to firms such as GE who first adopted shareholder value 
logics, and the earlier development by the US media of PEP ranking tables, it is 
perhaps not surprising that when US firms arrived in England they were much more 
profitable. This had, then, two effects that encouraged the adoption of financial 
practices in English law firms. First, it created reputation problems for English firms. 
Being less profitable than US competitors created the risk of clients defecting to US 
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firms that were apparently more successful. Second, and more pragmatically, the 
more profitable US firms were also able to pay solicitors significantly more money 
and, therefore, poach star players from English firms. As one senior partner 
interviewed commented about this dilemma: 
“„I think it‟s fair to say that they [reports of PEP] must have some impact.  For 
example potential recruits may regard them as significant.  Perhaps some clients 
make a judgment on the quality of a law firm by how well it seems to be doing in 
those terms. So you cannot completely ignore the league tables” (Senior partner, top 
10 English firm). 
  
It could, then, be argued that US law firms themselves were vectors of 
financialization. Indeed, the increasing numbers of US-UK mergers, of which the 
Clifford Chance/Rodger Wells deal is the most prominent example, exposed UK firms 
to the more individualist and performance orientated remuneration systems, to 
financialized practices and most crucially to the higher profitability rates of their US 
counterparts. However, ultimately, this move towards financial practices was first 
instigated by local regulatory developments that led to important changes to the 
political-economic landscape in which English law firms had to operate and survive. 
Indeed, the effects of re-regulation on the financialization of English law firms can 
also been seen in more recent times when further regulatory changes have helped to 
reproduce and legitimize financialized management practices in law firms. 
 
 
Re-regulation and financialization II: The Legal Services Act 
 
In the post 2000 era a second regulatory „big bang‟ - The Legal Services Act – further 
reinforced the importance of finacialized management in the legal profession in 
England and Wales. As another example of reform inspired by neo-liberal doctrines, 
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under the provisions of the Legal Services Act it will be possible, for the first time, to 
separate ownership and control in law firms. Firms will, therefore, be able to attract 
external investors, such as private equity houses, and potentially „go all the way‟ with 
a full stock-exchange flotation. Indeed, it was anticipated that up to fifty percent of the 
firms in The Lawyers‟ UK 100 survey might seek outside investors and even a stock 
exchange listing (The Lawyer, 2007d).   
 
Whilst the Act has not taken full effect yet and its implications are still emergent and 
not properly understood, anticipation of its provisions has certainly fuelled 
financialized logics and practices. Indeed, at first, metrics such as PEP were seen as 
a way of valuing law firms so as to facilitate investment decisions. This led to multi-
billion pound stock-market valuations of the UK‟s leading firms (see for example The 
Sunday Times, 2007). Perhaps unsurprisingly, partners may, therefore, have been 
keen to maximise the value of their partnership equity by enhancing PEP and 
ultimately the supposed value of the firm to outside investors. More recently concerns 
have been raised about the value of PEP as a metric for investment purposes 
because of, amongst other things, the previously discussed ease with which firms 
can manipulate PEP through short term surgeries without improving underlying 
performance. Nevertheless, the regulatory change associated with the Legal 
Services Act certainly led to an intensified interest in PEP rankings, at least in the 
2003-2008 period. This helps explain the unprecedented increases in PEP levels 
noted in this period in table 3.     
 
 
Institutions guiding the adoption of financial practices 
 
Regulatory reform constitutes, then, the situated political-economic context in which 
the financialization of English law firms was possible. Neo-liberal reforms and the 
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changes in the English legal marketplace they inspired played a key role in the 
formation of a conjectural moment in which financialized management practices 
gained legitimacy. But, in line with ideas developed in existing work (Culpepper, 
2005; Feng et al., 2001; Lütz, 2004), institutional transformations were equally 
important, alongside and as part of the re-regulation process, in the development of 
PEP‟s legitimacy in the English context. It is, then, the dialogue and interaction 
between the regulatory and institutional that led to a period in time, between the late 
1980s and early 2000s, in which the reforms described above appeared legitimate 
and in line with common beliefs about how firms should operate. 
 
Re-regulation helped change the cultures of lawyers because of the way it elevated 
profitability up the list of law firm partners‟ concerns, thus making PEP a core 
preoccupation for those running large firms. This is not to say the norms and values 
(the institutions) of English lawyers were completely changed by events of the 1990s 
and 2000s. Rather, and in line with the ideas of Vitols (2004), a form of negotiated 
compromise emerged with financial performance, measured in terms of PEP, 
coexisting with other pre-existing values and norms; a compromise which at times 
can break down into conflicts as the norms and value of lawyers clash with the 
financially driven changes previously described. For example, English lawyers have 
often resisted the development of the performance related cultures associated with 
financially inspired management practices (see Faulconbridge, 2008b), something 
the firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Derringer has experienced most notably.  
 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Derringer has undergone a number of changes in the period 
from 1993 to 2008, including a merger with a German law firm designed to enhance 
the competitiveness of the original firm in the European marketplace (the firm was 
originally called Freshfields and gained its extended name after the merger). Indeed, 
this merger is partly the result of but also a cause of financialized management. As 
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figure 1 shows, the trend in terms of associate, salaried and equity partner numbers, 
and the effects of these on PEP reflect well the story outlined above. The firm grew 
leverage by expanding associate numbers in the late 1990s, introducing salaried 
partners and reducing the size of the equity partnership in the post 2000 period so to 
extract further gains in PEP. In particular this ‟surgery‟ on the equity partnership was 
associated with the need to offset the effects of less profitable offices and individuals, 
many of which inherited as a result of the earlier merger, on the relevant profitability 
metrics. But not all the lawyers affected by these changes have accepted the logic of 
reform. In England the firm was recently taken to an employment tribunal by a former 
partner who claimed de-equitization was unjustifiable and in a spirit contra to the 
partnership convention. The tribunal deemed that the firm had taken proportionate 
steps in pursuit of a legitimate (profit enhancing) goal but debate continues about 
whether this strategy is an appropriate way to manage a partnership and has led to 
many firms reassessing the appropriateness of PEP driven strategies and their 
related  surgeries (The Lawyer, 2007d).  
[insert figure 1 somewhere here] 
 
The reactions of lawyers to the introduction of financialized practices such as partner 
de-equitization in English law firms represent, then, a brake on the financialization 
process because, as one competing firms‟ managing partner put it: 
“You get to a certain level – say the £500,000 partner profits point – and the 
squeezing more out of the machine becomes increasingly difficult; particularly if you 
are not going for the big de-equitization push. You cannot ask associates to do much 
more than they are doing” (quoted in Legal Week 2007a).  
 
 Similarly, the role of the salaried partner within partnership forms of governance has 
also been questioned. As one interviewee commented: 
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“salaried partnership is effectively glorified employees and if I wanted to have an 
input, which I did, it would be very difficult to be heard.  And even if you were heard 
whether anyone took any notice was a whole different matter again” (Lawyer, firm in 
Lawyer‟s UK 100 table). 
 
Thus the case of large law firms represents an example of „negotiated 
financialization‟. A dialogue between political-economic influences (regulation) and 
institutional influences creates both the moment in which financialization gains 
legitimacy but also a context that defined its place-specific characteristics. In the 
case of English law firms text book models of reform were not always being possible 
because of the situating of restructuring processes in a specific institutional context at 
one moment in time. The case of English law firms shows, then, that geographical 
analyses of financialization processes are vital because of the way regulation and 
institutions interact and can affect both the timing and nature of change. This means 
that whilst law firms worldwide might have undergone surgeries as part of moves 
towards financialized management, this may not have occurred at the same time (the 
conjunctural moment emerges, or fails to emerge, in different ways) or in exactly the 
same way as in English firms.  
 
 
Questioning financial reform and the fall-out from the credit crisis 
 
In many ways, the financialization of law firms in the early 2000s was, then, a sign of 
the times. But, unsurprisingly, like the attempts by managers to prioritise shareholder 
value metrics like EVATM, the PEP inspired surgeries described above have been 
increasingly questioned by a range of commentators over the past 12 months as a 
result of the credit crunch and ensuing financial crisis and recession. In a recent 
report, Hilderbrandt/CitiBank (2008) argue that non-equity partners are actually less 
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productive than equity partners as they lack motivation because they do not share 
profits and feel that the increasing requirements for equity status make promotion a 
more uncertain and less realistic career target. Indeed, in light of such concerns 
some English lawyers originally involved in promoting financially driven practices are 
now publicly asking questions about the dangers of the PEP „game‟ and suggesting 
that alternatives are needed. Guy Beringer, who at the time was the managing 
partner of Allen and Overy, commented in an editorial placed on his website: 
“I argue that PEP is not an appropriate measure of the success of a law firm and 
should be replaced with measures which take account of sustainable profitability, 
client satisfaction and staff motivation” (see 
http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/Knowledge/Editorial.aspx?contentTypeID=1&ite
mID=34073&prefLangID=410).   
 
Similar comments were made by the Editor of Legal Week (see Legal Week 2007) 
whilst The Lawyer now reports earnings per partner (EPP) as a way of revealing 
which firms are „cooking the books‟ to enhance PEP. Indeed, comparing the change 
in PEP between 1993 and 2008 with EPP reveals that again, as a more „accurate‟ 
measure of efficiency and success just like PPP and PPL, EPP offers a much less 
impressive account of „growth‟ (70 percent growth in EPP between 1993-2008) than 
frailer measures such as PEP (157 percent growth).  
 
The financialized model of the law firm deserves even more scrutiny in the context of 
the impacts of the current financial crisis on firms. The law firms listed in table 2 are 
now scrambling to maintain profitability by slashing costs, leading to redundancies 
and de-equitizations (The Lawyer, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d,). Indeed, by February 2009 
job losses in the 200 largest English law firms since the onset of the credit crisis 
totalled over 3000 (The Lawyer, 2009e). And there is evidence that PEP calculations 
are influencing key decisions as downsizing programmes try to safeguard key 
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profitability measures by targeting equity partners as well as salaried solicitors in 
redundancy schemes. Indeed, firms such as Linklaters and Addleshaw‟s have culled 
13% and 11% of their partnerships respectively in their attempts to pursuit „smaller 
and more profitable‟ configurations (The Lawyer 2009a). Others, including Clifford 
Chance and Freshfields Bruckhaus Derringer, are currently undergoing „partnership 
reshaping‟ exercises, another term for downsizing the equity partner pool. It seems, 
then, that PEP is still a key consideration in the current reorganization of the 
profession and falls in PEP are deemed unacceptable even in a recession. Questions 
might be asked, therefore, about whether responses to the current crisis are likely to 
reproduce the hegemony of financialized logics in law firm management or whether 
the broader questions now being asked about the logics of financialized capitalism 
might impact on the way law firms view management inspired by metrics like PEP. It 
is entirely possible that the conjunctural moment in which PEP gained legitimacy has 
now passed and the future will involve very different measures of law firms‟ success 
and very different management strategies.  
 
In this context, and perhaps more fundamentally, it could be argued that the PEP 
phenomenon is partially responsible for the severity of the crisis many law firms are 
now facing and should therefore be disbanded in future attempts to assess law firm 
performance. Whilst the global downturn that occurred in 2007-2008 is 
unprecedented in recent history, the structure of law firms post-PEP surgery seems 
to have left them more vulnerable than they were during previous recessions. This 
suggestion can be developed by looking at the experience of one firm, Slaughter and 
May, from 1993 to the current recession. The firm remains one of the most profitable 
(see table 2) despite operating in a largely traditional fashion and following a now 
atypical model when compared to the financially-driven management practiced by the 
majority of firms in our sample. This firm has a broad business base and in the post-
2000 period did not focus excessively on the transactional work generated by 
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securitisation and other „exotic‟ financial instruments. It has not merged or expanded 
overseas and, as table 5 shows, does not use salaried partners in significant 
numbers and has the most compressed leverage ratio in our sample which has 
actually declined over the period of observation. In other words, this firm has secured 
exceptional levels of performance, as measured by PEP (240 percent growth) but 
also other indicators such as EPP (187 percent growth), PPP (223 percent growth) 
and PPL (353 percent growth), despite making only limited concessions to 
discourses and practices of financialized management and continuing to operate in a 
more „traditional‟ mould. Significantly, at the time of writing, Slaughter and May has 
not yet made any redundancies, suggesting such „traditional‟ structures are more 
stable and sustainable in the long-term because of their maintenance of an emphasis 
on broad-based high quality, high margin work that uses relatively small pools of 
junior lawyers as leverage for profit generation. It would seem, then, that those 
running Slaughter & May did not buy into the financialized logics that had their 
moment in the 1990s and 2000s. In contrast, many firms that did buy into this ideal 
and followed PEP-inspired management practices and focussed on quality but also 
quantity in order to boost measures of PEP through leverage, have suffered much 
more severely as diminishing demand takes an exaggerated toll on revenues and 
profits. The downturn has left large pools of under-employed junior lawyers in firms 
that have adopted PEP-inspired management, pools which cannot now be sustained; 
thus turning leverage from an asset to a liability. For example, whilst Slaughter and 
May has to utilize 5 salaried lawyers for every equity partner, Clifford Chance has to 
support 8, meaning reductions in fee income escalate at a much more rapid pace 
and become quickly unsustainable. It seems, then, that the recession has again 
revealed one of the major frailties of financially-inspired management in law firms: 




Conclusions: the situated emergence of financialized English law firms 
 
This paper explains the radical reorganization of large law firms in England in terms 
of the ascendency of new financialized discourses and practices which, through the 
proxy indicator of PEP, somewhat unexpectedly reproduced the logics of finance 
capitalism in the domain of law. Thus, the case of the English legal profession 
represents another strand to the „capitalization of everything‟ thesis (Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1997) and shows how selective management designed to optimise perceived 
financial performance can reconfigure organizations that might be assumed to be 
less directly affected by the logics of financial markets. The paper reveals how in the 
profession of law, like in other market-listed industries, the new concern for financial 
targets and metrics fuelled a series of unprecedented surgeries leading to a radical 
reorganization of professional practices, structures, values and labour markets. In 
particular, financial logics pervaded the shift of law towards a largely employed 
occupation as well as the redefinition of the concept of partnership itself, which 
previously had stood still for over two centuries.  
 
In terms of the literatures on cultural economy and on financialization, this reveals the 
importance of further analysing how, what Thrift (1997) calls the „circuits of soft 
capitalism‟, help to „script‟ the behaviours of firms through their promotion of 
performative models such as PEP. In the case of law, the role of PEP league tables 
cannot be underestimated and led to law firms embarking on what Feng et al. (2001) 
would call a utopian quest for success that had uncertain consequences. The crisis 
facing law firms as a result of the credit crunch and ensuing recession exemplifies 
the dangers of such an approach. Firms following PEP-inspired management 
strategies are now apparently facing unprecedented challenges in terms of the need 
for redundancies both to offset the bloating associated with PEP-inspired leverage 
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and to ensure the impacts of the recession on PEP performance are minimised so to 
maintain the position of the firm in league tables. This shows that reforms associated 
with financialized management affect workers not only at times of the initial „surgery‟ 
but also in the long-term as the stability of the firm and employment is potentially 
jeopardised.       
 
This paper has also sought to develop understanding of how geographically specific 
contexts mediate the reproduction of financialized logics in particular conjunctural 
moments. At one level the paper shows that whilst the discourse of PEP and the 
media‟s role in proliferating its logics helps explain much of the surgery that occurred 
in English firms, re-regulation also had a significant influence on the financialization 
of firms because it created a context in which the logics of PEP and associated 
surgery gained legitimacy. Without the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, 
and without the Legal Services Act, the incentive for change would not have existed 
and the legitimacy of financialized models would have been harder to attain. Thus, 
following Culpepper (2005), Vitols (2004) and Jürgens et al. (2000), this suggests 
that the situated development of financial practices has to be understood as not just 
a cultural-economic phenomenon tied to financial discourses but also a political-
economic phenomenon with timing related to broader changes in regulation that 
reflect particular situated perspectives on how firms should operate. But re-regulation 
also needs to and does inspire situated institutional reconfigurations, in this case to 
ensure that the norms and values of those running firms changed to support the 
structural reforms associated with financialized management. This was a negotiated 
change that was not completely successful, suggesting that the financialization of 
(law) firms, whilst a worldwide phenomenon, is taking place at place-specific 
moments, in place-specific ways with place-specific forms of resistance that lead to 
continuity and change in the structure of firms.  
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It would seem, therefore, that further situated analyses of financialization, in a range 
of industries as the financialization of everything continues, will be important in the 
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